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STRATEGIC WEAPONS

A. The Soviets in the SAL Environment. US collection and analytical effort must focus on the early phases of Soviet military R&D and on Soviet planning. At issue is the degree of progress the Soviets intend to make within the constraints of the Agreements, and whether they intend to comply with them. Soviet perceptions of the US as a strategic competitor will help to shape Soviet decisions in this area. In the coming year the key intelligence questions will be:

1. Soviet ICBMs

- How many types of MIRVed ICBMs do the Soviets intend to develop?
- Will the Soviets develop a mobile ICBM?

2. Soviet Nuclear Weapons Development

- Do the Soviets have sufficient quantities of fissionable materials available for their anticipated programs?
- Would the termination of underground testing (e.g., under a comprehensive test ban) prevent deployment of Soviet systems with optimum nuclear warheads?

3. Soviet Bomber

- What is the probable mission of the Backfire?
- How many will be deployed?
- Are any other bomber developments in evidence?

4. Soviet Naval Offensive Systems

- Will the Soviets seek a full inventory of Delta/SS-N-8 submarines in place of older sea-launched systems?

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- Will the Soviets pursue a long range SLCM as a complement to their strategic arsenal?

5. Soviet Strategic Defensive Forces

- Will the Soviets develop laser weapons for the strategic defense problem?
- Will Soviet efforts in unconventional approaches to ASW provide them a quantum increase in capabilities against the US FBM force?

6. Soviet Views of US Strategic Capabilities

- What are Soviet views of major US weapons programs and their future?
- In particular, will the 2nd ABM site be contingent, in Moscow's view, on a US decision to construct an NCA site?

B. PRC as a Nuclear Power. The Chinese have almost achieved an effective nuclear deterrent against the USSR, and might develop a limited nuclear capability against the United States. The achievement of these qualitative changes in China's strategic relationship with the two superpowers seems to depend more on incremental developments in known systems than on the emergence of new ones. The key intelligence questions are:

1. PRC Strategic Offensive Forces

- What are the specific characteristics of land-based missile systems with special reference to ranges, vulnerability, reliability, accuracies, reaction times, and targeting sectors?
- Where are such missiles deployed?
- What are the characteristics and performance data of the intended SLBM(s)?
- What is the stage of production of the SSBN?

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2. PRC Nuclear Weapons Program

- What is the direction of the R&D effort?
- What are the number and type of warheads, rate of production, and location of stockpiles?

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
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ECONOMICS

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B. Economic Developments Affecting US National Security.
US dependence on other countries' mineral resources, especially petroleum, is rapidly increasing. At the same time, the oil-producing states are enjoying rising incomes from their oil exports, bringing them an enormous accumulation of financial wealth. Elsewhere the Soviet Union is seeking to make up for deficiencies in its economy; in so doing it is engaging in increased economic exchanges with the United States. The key questions related to the foregoing are:

1. Soviet Economic Capabilities and Vulnerabilities

- To what extent will the Soviet economy fail to produce sufficient feedgrains and oilseeds in the 1974 crop year, thereby forcing Moscow to again purchase quantities abroad?
- What are Moscow's objectives in seeking increased economic exchanges with the United States?
- Are the Soviets playing off Tokyo and Washington re development of their fossil fuels?
- What are the "proved" reserves at Tyumen and Yakutsk?
- Does Moscow perceive a tie between an agricultural deficit and fuel surplus?
- Are there other ways in which the USSR can bring pressure to bear on the United States in economic matters?
- In what ways are nonagricultural sectors dependent on imported technology to sustain growth and modernization?
- What is the impact on military programs of economic capabilities and vulnerabilities?

2. Linkage of Oil and Monetary Reserves in the Middle East

- What is the composition of monetary reserves of the oil-producing countries and movements from one currency to another, particularly the sale of dollars on European currencies markets?

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- To what uses are these countries putting their oil revenues (e.g., internal development, investment in the West, support the Fedayeen)?
- Which oil producers intend to use monetary leverage to affect US policies?
- What changes are likely to occur in their negotiating positions that may affect the output, export, and price of oil?

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- What is the involvement of the Soviet Union in Middle East oil matters?

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
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ARAB WORLD AND PERSIAN GULF AREA

The political and military stability of the region is of primary importance to the development of US interests in the near term. The priority interests of the US are continuing access to oil supplies, increasing US influence with the Arab states and reducing the vulnerability of the region to Soviet influence. The key intelligence questions for FY 74 are:

1. Arab-Israeli Conflict



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2. Stability of Persian Gulf Area

- Are there indications of a changing political orientation in these states?
- Are there signs of increasing tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran?
- What opportunities are developing for the USSR, Japan, and Western Europe to increase their political and economic influence in the Gulf area?
- Are Iran's ambitions for regional hegemony stimulating counter moves by Saudi Arabia, Iraq, India, or other states?

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3. Security and Stability of Pakistan

- Are there indications of serious internal security problems in the Baluchistan area of Pakistan?
- Are there serious political or security problems developing in Pakistan's northwest frontier?
- Does Afghanistan intend to maintain a non-provocative policy toward Pakistan?
- What are the indications of a more aggressive Indian policy toward Pakistan, or vice versa?

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SOUTHEAST ASIA

The challenge of on-going insurgencies or the threat of latent insurgent movements is being faced by all Southeast Asian nations. The defeat of local governments, particularly those of South Vietnam, Thailand and the Philippines, could have serious impact upon U. S. interests. In the coming year the key intelligence question will be:

1. Prospects for Renewed Fighting in Southeast Asia
During FY 74

- Will the North Vietnamese or other Communist forces renew major military action in Indo-China during FY 74?
- What restraints will be imposed upon the North Vietnamese by Soviet and PRC pressure?
- Should the Khmer Republic fall, would the emergent Phnom Penh government be independent of Hanoi?
- Will Hanoi attempt to expand the insurgency in Thailand during FY 74?

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NORTHEAST ASIA

The priority intelligence subjects in Northeast Asia relate to two broad problems. These are: the nature, scope, and intensity of the Sino-Soviet confrontation and the impact which changes in the Chinese Communist leadership will have on PRC policies. In the coming year the key intelligence questions are:

1. Status of Sino-Soviet Political Relations

- What is the likelihood that bilateral negotiations will result in some form of nonaggression pact before 1975?

2. Likely Changes in the Aged PRC Political and Military Leadership

- Who are the leading candidates to succeed the present leadership?
- What indications are there of the likely direction of political and military change under this new leadership?

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USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

Soviet foreign policies are partly a function of internal changes, both in the USSR and in the countries concerned. As difficult as it has been to acquire reliable information on internal Soviet politics, renewed efforts must be made. Among the USSR's near neighbors, the strategically vital country of Yugoslavia is entering a period of major change and potential turmoil. To what extent the Soviets may seek to exploit this situation depends on such factors as the composition of the Soviet leadership, Moscow's reading of the likely Western response, and the sources of stability in Yugoslavia itself. Key political questions concerning the USSR and Eastern Europe are:

1. Soviet Political Vulnerabilities

- What are the internal power dynamics among Brezhnev's potential successors against Brezhnev's position?
- What are the continuing effects domestically of the regime's detente policies with the West?
- What are the most severe grievances at present among the national minorities?
- What evidence is needed to improve the confidence of our answers to these questions?

2. Yugoslav Military Establishment as a Political Factor

- What are the political attitudes, including ethnic biases of the Yugoslav high command?
- Do they favor or oppose any particular political leaders?
- Do the Yugoslav generals expect a post-Tito crisis?
- Do they fear Soviet intervention or lack of Western support in such a crisis?

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GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

The challenge to the intelligence community in supporting MBFR negotiations will be more difficult in some ways than it has been for SAL agreements. Many important elements of the Warsaw Pact's capability to fight nuclear and conventional war in Europe are imprecisely known, and changes in force and equipment levels will be difficult to monitor. Meanwhile, the Soviets are expanding their military capabilities in more distant areas. For the next year the key questions will be:

1. Nuclear Weapons

- Are there nuclear weapons stored in Eastern Europe?
- Do the Soviets intend to deploy nuclear artillery rounds with their ground force units?

2. Naval General Purpose Forces

- What are the implications of the Soviet anti-ship cruise missile threat?
- What will be the role of the Soviet aircraft carrier, how many will appear, and in what time frame?

3. Soviet Mobilization

- What is the degree of effectiveness of newly mobilized Soviet theater forces compared with the best Soviet standing forces?
- What evidence is required to improve our confidence in Soviet capability to mobilize theater forces?

4. Soviet Military Presence in Third World Areas

- Do the Soviets intend to establish bases in Syria, Somalia, Bangladesh, Cuba, Guinea, Iraq, South Yemen?

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LATIN AMERICA

The improvement of our understanding of Latin American political dynamics and their effect on U.S. interests is of primary importance during FY 74. While communist-sponsored insurgent/terrorist activities will continue to be a threat to U.S. interests in some countries, the preponderant force working against U.S. interests in most countries will be the emergence of highly nationalistic governments. Because of the highly personal nature of these governments, an in-depth understanding of governmental leaders is of prime importance. Various nationalistic governments will often act in concert in regional organizations and new alignments impacting on U.S. interests are likely to develop. In the coming year the key intelligence questions will be:

1. Panama and the Canal Negotiations

- How far will Panama go in order to try to force a treaty with the U.S.?
- Would Panama continue to negotiate without signs of progress?
- If either side breaks negotiations, what would be Panama's course?
- What Panamanian vulnerabilities are exploitable by the U.S. in negotiations?
- What will Torrijos ultimately settle for?

2. Cuban-Soviet Relations

- What Soviet pressures are being applied to Cuba and what is their effect?
- Will the Soviets continue to upgrade Cuba's weapons systems and to what degree?

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4. Inter-American Regional Organization

- What changes in the Organization of American States (OAS) are likely?



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- What are the chances for a regional organization which would exclude the U.S. ?
- What alignments are likely to develop in the OAS and over what issues?
- What roles will the OAS or other regional groups play in really shaping political and economic policies?



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